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Abstract—The NIS Directive introduces obligations for the
security of the network and information systems of opera-
tors of essential services and of digital service providers and
require from the national competent authorities to assess their
compliance to these obligations. This paper describes a novel
cybersecurity maturity assessment framework (CMAF) that is
tailored to the NIS Directive requirements and can be used
either as a self assessment tool from critical national infras-
tructures either as an audit tool from the National Competent
Authorities for cybersecurity.
1. Introduction
Cyber attacks could contribute towards the collapse of a
state if they initiate or prolong the failure of Critical National
Infrastructures (CNI). Nations are becoming reliant on the
cyber domain to provide services that keep a nation running:
power grids, water supplies, communications, transportation
and finance are all increasingly becoming cyber dependant.
The NIS Directive (Directive (EU) 2016/1148) (Euro-
pean Union, 2016) has certain obligations that each mem-
ber state should follow, with a major goal of enhancing
cybersecurity posture across the EU. Having to cope with
the obligations of the NIS directive and to meet strict
deadlines, Greece has taken some steps forward [1]. The
directive and a relevant national Law (Greek National Law
4577/2018)(Greek Government, 2018) introduce obligations
for the Security Of The Network And Information Systems
Of Operators Of Essential Services (OES) and the Secu-
rity Of The Network And Information Systems Of Digital
Service Providers (DSP) and require from the National
Competent Authorities (NCA) to assess the compliance of
operators of essential services and digital service providers
with these obligations.
More specifically, the Greek National Law 4577/2018
(Greek Government, 2018) states that the National Cyber-
security Authority (NCSA), acting as the NCA for cyberse-
curity, in collaboration with the relevant CSIRTs and other
organizations and entities as appropriate assesses the tech-
nical and organizational measures implemented by OES, in
order to manage risks related to the security of network and
information systems used in their activities, regarding their
suitability and their proportionality”. Additionally, NCSA
”assesses the suitability of the measures implemented by
DSP for the avoidance and the minimization of the impact of
incidents affecting the security of network and information
systems used for the provision of the basic services, aiming
to assure their business continuity”.
Moreover, the objectives of the NCA across the EU
reach further than just the collection of evidence send by the
assessed entities and include the vision to reach a common
level of cybersecurity posture. In order to effectively meet
this vision, an initial step for NCSA was to conduct an
assessment of the current cybersecurity posture of public
sectors’ main ICT services, using a structured question-
naire. This assessment revealed inconsistencies and major
misalignment among different entities [2]. As a result, the
below additional targets are proposed:
• Standardization of the collected feedback
• Assignment of a specific level of security, based in
the implemented controls per category
• Analysis of the outputs and extraction of relevant
statistical information regarding the level achieved
per industry, category and service
• Implementation of comparisons between subsequent
assessments, in order to monitor progress
• Extraction of possible correlations or contrasts be-
tween the information security posture among stake-
holders
• Conduction of further analysis and definition of best
practices
The minimum security requirements that OES and DSP
have to comply with, have been defined in Decision 1027
published in 3739, B, 08.10.2019 Official Gazette of the
Greek Government (Greek Government, 2019). This set of
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requirements, covering areas like Risk Management, Access
Control, Physical and Environmental Controls etc, is generic
in phrasing and does not provide specifications regarding the
requirements implementation. For example, for the area of
physical and environmental security, the requirement is that
the installations of data centers and information processing
facilities shall be protected against physical or environmen-
tal risk through suitable and relevant policies and measures
based on a risk management strategy (Greek Government,
2019). This phrasing, although mandated by the fact that
the entities required to comply with these requirements
have a great variety in terms of business operation, size,
security posture and technical and organizational capability,
is difficult to be monitored effectively by the NCA in order
to achieve the objectives mentioned above.
What was needed in order to facilitate the fulfillment
of the NCSAs objectives, especially the measurable ones,
was a tool to standardize the possible maturity levels of the
organizations. For this purpose a specific assessment frame-
work, the Cybersecurity Maturity Assessment Framework
(CMAF), was designed and tested for implementation. The
CMAF could help identify the strengths and weaknesses
of an organizations processes and examine how closely
these processes comply to related identified best practices
or guidelines.
The assessment framework consists of the security con-
trols against which the organizations processes are appraised
and the scale, based on which the rating of compliance
of the organizations processes is evaluated. Based on the
proposed targets mentioned above the assessment model
should incorporate the following characteristics:
• Cover the full extent of the security requirements
complying to the NIS directive obligations
• Be able to be used as a self-assessment tool
• Be able to be used as a basis for an independent
assessment
• Provide clear results regarding the security posture
of the organizations
• Be able to be used as a benchmarking tool per
industry, type of organization and area of operation
• Be able to be used as a guide for security require-
ments implementation by the organizations
• Be measurable
• Be easily extractable
1.1. Design of the framework
In order to design the CMAF, a combination of literature
review regarding security requirements and a review of
existing frameworks (related to cybersecurity or other well
established areas) was conducted. At the time of the con-
duction of this review, there was only a limited number of
established frameworks in the field, although during the past
months, some more have been introduced. The literature re-
view regarding security requirements included 16 basic doc-
uments. These documents were published by organizations
like ENISA, ISO, CIS, European Union, NIST, ISACA and
others. The review regarding existing frameworks included
frameworks or models from organizations like: CMMI, CIS,
ENISA, Department of Homeland Security USA, Citigroup,
U.S.Department of Energy and others.
1.2. The maturity scale
After the review of the existing frameworks, it was
decided that the CMAF would be based in a 6-levels
maturity scale (Figure 1). For each level of the maturity
scale, a different seal was selected. The seals represent a
series of concentric cycles. The lowest possible score being
represented by one cycle and the highest by six. The color
of each cycle has been selected from the PH scale red being
the lowest and blue the highest.
• Maturity Level 5: Efficient - Optimized
The organization has implemented methods for the
continuous improvement of the implemented con-
trols and the security posture of the organization.
A full risk-based approach is followed and a cost-
benefit balance is applied. The necessary controls
are implemented, measured and controlled at the
described level.
• Maturity Level 4: Effective - Quantitatively Man-
aged
The organization has set relevant objectives. The
objectives (were possible S.M.A.R.T.) are being
monitored, measured, analyzed and evaluated. The
necessary controls are implemented, measured and
controlled at the described level.
• Maturity Level 3: Advanced - Defined
There is a standardized method regarding the ful-
fillment of the requirement. The necessary controls
are implemented, measured and controlled at the
described level.
• Maturity Level 2: Basic - Managed
There is a concrete plan regarding the fulfillment
of the requirement. The necessary controls are im-
plemented, but are partially measured and partially
controlled.
• Maturity Level 1: Initial - Reactive
The organization has started implemented the re-
quirement, but the extent of the implementation is
partial or reactive.
• Maturity Level 0: Incomplete - Not existing
The requirement under examination is not imple-
mented or it is implemented only partially or ad hoc.
1.3. The requirements
The basis of the CMAF and thus the requirements of
the framework, are those that have been published under
the sections Common Security Policy and ”Baseline Se-
curity Requirements”, in Ministerial Decree 1027 - 3739,
B, 08.10.2019 Official Gazette of the Greek Government
(Greek Government, 2019). These requirements are grouped
under the following categories:
Figure 1. Maturity levels representation
• Information Security Policy
• Business Environment
• Asset Management
• Risk Assessment
• Risk Management Strategy
• Supply Chain Risk Management
• Self-Assessment and Improvement
• Policies, Processes and Procedures for the protection
of essential services
• Identity Management and Access Control
• Physical and Environmental Security
• Systems and Applications Security
• Data Security
• Backups
• Security Technologies
• Systems Testing
• Change Management
• Awareness and Training
• Threat Detection
• Incident Management
• Business Continuity
• Disaster Recovery
For each of these categories the applicable controls have
been recognized, analyzed and assigned to the appropriate
level, as described in the maturity scale above.
1.4. The framework structure
The structure of the resulting framework is the follow-
ing:
• A. IDENTIFICATION
Requirement A1. Business Environment
Requirement A2. Asset Management
Requirement A3. Risk Assessment
Requirement A4. Risk Management Strategy
Requirement A5. Supply Chain Risk Management
Requirement A6. Self-Assessment Improvement
• B. PROTECTION
Requirement B7. Policies, Processes and Procedures
for the protection of essential services.
Sub - Requirement B7.1 : Information Security Pol-
icy, Processes and Procedures
Sub - Requirement B7.2 : Communication and ac-
ceptance
Requirement B8. Identity Management and Access
Control
Sub - Requirement B8.1 Asset Management
Sub - Requirement B8.2. Access control for privi-
leged accounts
Sub - Requirement B8.3. Management of equipment
for administrative purposes
Sub - Requirement B8.4. Access Control
Sub - Requirement B8.5. Authentication mecha-
nisms
Requirement B.9. Physical and Environmental secu-
rity
Requirement B.10. Systems and Applications secu-
rity
Sub - Requirement B.10.1.: Systems Security
Sub - Requirement B.10.2.: Application Security
Sub - Requirement B.10.3.: Security in Application
Development
Requirement B.11. Data Security
Sub - Requirement B.11.1.: Encryption
Sub - Requirement B.11.2.: Data Classification
Requirement B.12. Backups
Requirement B.13. Security Technologies
Sub - Requirement B.13.1. : Traffic filtering
Sub - Requirement B.13.2.: Segregation of systems
Sub - Requirement B.13.3. : Malware protection
Requirement B.14. Systems Testing
Sub - Requirement B.14.1.: Security Assessments
Sub - Requirement B.14.2.: Compliance Checking
Requirement B.15. Change Management
Requirement B.16. Awareness and Training
• C. DEFENSE
Requirement C.17. Threat Detection
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the security assessment
Requirement C.18. Incident Management
Requirement C.19. Business Continuity
Requirement C.20 Disaster Recovery
1.5. Framework validation
Since the framework was primarily based on literature
review, it was decided that before its release, it should be
validated through an implementation pilot project. The pilot
project should include organizations from different sectors,
of different sizes and with different security postures. To
achieve this, the following pilots were selected for validation
purposes:
• A mid-sized OES from healthcare sector, that is
expected to have a low level of maturity
• A mid-sized OES from Digital Infrastructures sector,
that is expected to have a medium level of maturity
• A large-sized OES from air-transport sector, that is
expected to have a high level of maturity
The pilot assessments were carried out by an experts
team consisting of: One expert from the project team,
involved in the development of the CMAF with a deep
knowledge of the framework itself and with high security
control auditing skills, and two experts from the NCSA,
tasked with the monitoring of the framework implementation
process and the review of the related outcomes.
The assessments were carried out via the following
methods: Table-top assessment, Interview and On site visit.
The results of the assessments and the improvements pro-
posed, were gathered, analyzed and incorporated in the final
version of the model. In Figure 2 the graphical representa-
tion of the assessment result of a fictitious organization, that
is produced from the model implementation, is presented.
2. Related Work
Authors in [3] describe a cybersecurity capability matu-
rity model as a means by which an organisation can assess
its current level of maturity of its practices. They provide
a comparative study of cybersecurity capability maturity
models that builds on a previous review [4]. The research
presents an assessment of the differences, advantages and
disadvantages of a systematic review of published studies
from 2012 to 2017.The method was based on a modified
taxonomy of software improvement environments across
five categories proposed by Halvorson and Conradi [5]:
1) General: The broad attributes of the improvement
environment.
2) Process: Describing how the environment is used.
3) Organisation: The features that articulate the rela-
tionship between the organisation and the environ-
ment in which it is used.
4) Quality: The indicators used to determine quality
in the environment.
5) Result: A statement of the required outcomes, asso-
ciated costs, and the methods used for evaluation.
Rea-Guaman et al [4] reduce the categories to three,
arguing that quality and result do not support the comparison
of cybersecurity capability maturity models.
The research considers the Systems Security Engineer-
ing Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), Cybersecurity
Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) [6], Community Cyber
Security Maturity Model (CCSMM) [7], National Initiative
for Cybersecurity Education Capability Maturity Model
(NICE) [8].
The analysis concludes that all four models require a
degree of customisation, and that SSE-CMM is the most
established of those reviewed. The paper assessed C2M2 as
the only model focused on cybersecurity. It went on to state
that C2M2 and CCSMM are designed to be implemented
in conjunction with the NIST framework and that recent
updates to the models had not been identified. It further
concluded that only SSE-CMM and C2M2 provided detailed
considerations of risk. The research did not present a model
to address the issues identified within those reviewed.
Sabillon [9] reviews the best practices and methodolo-
gies in cybersecurity assurance and audit and presents the
Cyber Security Audit Model (CSAM) for use by organ-
isations and nation states to validate audit, preventative,
forensic and detective controls. CSAM comprises 18 do-
mains, with one limited to nation states and the remaining
17 applicable to organisations in general. All domains have
at least one sub-domain, controls, checklists, sub-controls,
and scorecard. The authors compare CSAM to the NIST
Cyber Security Framework (CSF) version 1.1 and the Audit
First Methodology [10], highlighting the differences. The
work describes the CSAM model and states it was tested,
implemented and validated in a Canadian higher education
institution, although no results are presented, and its efficacy
is not evidenced.
The research does not indicate whether CSAM requires
specific expertise for its use, or whether self-assessment is
feasible. Neither does it present whether the model provides
any actionable outcomes following its use.
Akinsanya [11] performed a literature review of cyber
security models for healthcare organisations adopting cloud
computing. The analysis considers the following:
• Information Security Focus Area Maturity Model
(ISFAM) [12]
• Cloud Security Capability Maturity Model
(CSCMM)
• UK National Health Service (NHS) National Infras-
tructure Maturity Model (NIMM) [13]
• Health Information Network (HIN) Capability Ma-
turity Model
The analysis found that ISFAM was targeted on small
to medium enterprises with a focus of use within software
development environments and could not demonstrate a
capacity to integrate emerging technologies such as cloud
computing. CSCMM was identified as able to support a
range of organisational sizes but deemed too technically
complex to implement in healthcare. The NHS NIMM was
assessed as relevant to the cyber security assessment of
a healthcare organisation. It was considered to provide an
assessment of an organisations cyber security maturity and
provided a basis to define which steps were required to
achieve a greater level of maturity. It demonstrated a capac-
ity to support platform independence but did not show an
ability to accommodate the characteristics of cloud comput-
ing or its resulting threats. The researchers judged that the
HIN Capability Maturity Model has similar characteristics
and constraints as the NHS NIMM.
The researchers concluded that maturity models provide
a compliance model that could not support the complexity of
the emerging cyber environment, particularly for healthcare
organisations adopting cloud technologies. The conclusions
highlight three specific areas of concern and requirements
for further work:
• Cyber security maturity models should focus on
more than standards compliance.
• Any new measures of maturity introduced should
be provided with adequate metrics to make them
meaningful.
• The model should be extensible to accommodate the
dynamic nature of the cyber security threat land-
scape.
The research focuses specifically on healthcare and the
adoption of cloud computing and does not consider adoption
beyond this industry or technology.
Miron and Muita [14] examine cybersecurity maturity
models to identify the standards and controls available to
providers of critical national infrastructures (CNI). The re-
search considers the cyber threats to CNI and the impact of
a loss of such services. The authors document nine cyberse-
curity capability maturity models assessed as applicable to
CNI. These are presented based on their applicability to ei-
ther specific CNI sub-sectors or their general cyber security
focus. The review concludes that, of the models considered,
none are designed to address the scenario of a CNI operator
with a multiplicity of interdependent systems. Instead, the
authors propose, the models are described at a high level
and focus on CNI or industry sub-sectors and present the
need for a model to support municipal governments.
Adler [15] states that capability maturity models are
inherently static and diagnostic, in that they identify maturity
gaps but are not directly actionable. The research proposes
a methodology that follows three stages:
1) Model: Captures the organisations current-state cy-
bersecurity maturity levels, formulates a maturity
improvement plan, and identifies influences factors
that will shape the organisations cybersecurity pos-
ture.
2) Simulate: Produces dynamic simulations of scenar-
ios to determine how particular cybersecurity situa-
tions could evolve within the organisation, potential
interventions, and likely outcomes and impacts.
3) Analyse: Assesses the projected mitigation costs
and risk reduction benefits, comparing outcomes
across alternate plans and scenarios.
The stages are illustrated through an analysis based
upon extension to the Electric Sub-sector Cybersecurity
Capability Maturity Model (ES-C2M2) [16]. ES-C2M2 is
a lightweight adaptation of the Resilience Maturity Model
[17]. This extension describes that the requirement for any
process improvement elements within the maturity model
should provide explicit guidance for improving performance
levels towards a desired end-state.
The research describes a set of decision support tools
implemented in a proprietary software package but does
not provide data or results from experimental use of the
proposed approach.
Le and Hoang in [18] investigate existing cybersecurity
maturity models to examine their strengths and weaknesses.
They provide a comparison of 12 models mapped against
five levels of maturity proposed by Humphrey (1989), con-
cluding that models require relevant quantitative metrics for
measurable and actionable assessment. No examples of such
metrics are provided.
Almuhammadi and Alsaleh in [19] review the NIST
Cyber Security Framework (CSF) for critical infrastructures
in order to assess how it can be applied to cybersecurity
maturity models and to determine if any gaps exist. The
authors propose that one of the key benefits of a cybersecu-
rity capability maturity model is that it provides a structure
to allow stakeholders to reach a consensus and set agreed
priorities. The authors state that the NIST CSF does not
provide organisations with a mechanism to measure the
progress of a NIST implementation, or the maturity levels
and information security processes capabilities. They assess
that the framework focuses on high-level information secu-
rity requirements and is applicable for the development of
information security programmes and policies. They contrast
this to other frameworks such as COBIT, ISO 27001, and
the ISF Standard of Good Practice (SoGP) for Information
Security. They argue that these focus on information se-
curity technical and functional controls, and that they are
applicable for developing checklists and conducting com-
pliance/audit assessments. The research proposes an infor-
mation security maturity model that is able to measure the
implementation progress of a security programme over time
and assesses the reliability of the IT services that underpin a
business. No examples of such measures are provided, and
no experimental data is presented.
3. Discussion
The National Competent Authorities for cybersecurity,
especially those who need to comply with the NIS directive,
could use the proposed maturity assessment framework in
order to request from the applicable organizations the imple-
mentation of self-assessments based on the framework and
collect the results. The authorities can review the collected
responses, analyze the data and produce valuable conclu-
sions. Also, comments regarding possible improvements can
be collected by the authorities from the applicable organi-
zations as well as from the dedicated staff dealing with the
assessment of the results. Adapted version of the CMAF
or other similar models incorporating specific requirements
for cloud services and OT/ IoT environments could also be
used. Based on the findings of the cybersecurity assessment
of the Critical National Infrastructures, additional cyber se-
curity controls may be applied. Those security controls can
be classified according to legal, technical, organizational,
capacity building, and cooperation aspects
4. Conclusions
As Critical National Infrastructures are becoming more
vulnerable to cyber attacks, their protection becomes a
significant issue for any organization, as well as a nation.
Similar to other information technology (IT) processes, cy-
bersecurity often follows a lifecycle model of prediction,
protection, detection, and reaction. Moreover, an assess-
ment is an activity that helps identify the strengths and
weaknesses of an organizations processes and examine how
closely these processes relate to identified best practices
and guidelines. In order to help in the evaluation of the
cybersecurity posture of CNI, a novel cybersecurity ma-
turity assessment framework, the CMAF, is presented in
this paper. The proposed framework consists of 20 security
categories, 6 maturity levels and and can be used both as
a self assessment and as an external audit tool, facilitating
organisations to perform a gap analysis and receive graphical
representation of their security posture. Information that will
be collected from the framework can be used, after proper
aggregation and anonymisation processes, from National
Competent Authorities in order to identify common security
gaps and prioritise future security programmes and funding
actions on a national or European level.
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